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drawn from premises established by proof. Young v. State, 194 Ind. 221,
141 N. E. 309.
The state's evidence of knowledge consisted of actual possession as
shown by testimony of the arresting officer. The issue presented was
whether the presumption of knowledge was overcome by appellant. In
face of that the finding of the court must be taken to mean that the
testimony of appellant and Fennoff was discredited. The question of
credibility of witnesses is not open on appeal, and no new trial will be
granted generally, when case turns on the credibility of witnesses, even
though evidence was contradictory and might have authorized an opposite
finding of fact if testimony of appellant's witnesses had been believed.
16 Corp. Juris. 481; State v. Sullivan, (W. Va.) 47 S. E. 267; Goldman
v. U. S., 245 U. S. 474; Payne v. State, 194 Ind. 438. The reason for the
rule is that the trial court and jury have an opportunity to observe the
witness while the court of appeal does not. In this case, therefore, the
presumption of knowledge, in light of the finding, must be taken as
unrebutted, as it depended on the credibility of appellant and his witness
and was decided adversely to appellant and is not reviewable. That being
so, there was evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Appellant requested oral argument, which was Uenied. Petition for
oral argument is governed by Rule 26, Rules of Supreme and Appellate
Courts of Indiana, which in substance provides that if petition is made
within time for filing briefs, the court will set it down for oral argument.
The line of Indiana decisions on that point hold that where appellant's
case is thoroughly briefed, his position clearly stated, with the questions
relating thereto, the petition for oral argument will be denied where noth-
ing can be gained thereby. Young v. State, 194 Ind. 221, 141 N. E. 309;
Parrett v. State, 159 N. E. 755; Allgaier v. State, 164 N. E. 315; Gale v.
State, 168 N. E. 241; Seeger v. State, 168 N. E. 577; Ewbank, Indiana
Criminal Law, p. 627.
H. N. F.
MOTION TO MAX MORE SPECIFIC-REs GESTAE--CONTINUANCE-PROOF
OF INSURANcE-Plaintiff filed a complaint in two paragraphs alleging that
defendant approached the car in which plaintiff's daughter was riding
in the same direction at a dangerous and reckless rate of speed and with-
out warning purposely, recklessly, and carelessly tried to pass such car
while it was on a narrow fill, and because of a curve in the road and dust
defendant did not have a clear view of the road for 500 feet when he
tried to pass, and as a result plaintiff's car was struck and thrown down
an embankment, causing the death of plaintiff's daughter. In the second
paragraph plaintiff alleged that defendant, in trying to pass plaintiff's
car, crowded in so far and forced plaintiff's car so far to the right as to
cause the car's wheels to slip off the embankment and cause the driver
to lose control while trying to regain the roadbed. Defendant's demurrer
and motion to make more specific were overruled and this is assigned as
error. There are three more assignments of error: (1) The court's
action in allowing plaintiff's attorney to comment on the fact that de-
fendant was injured; (2) the refusal of the court to discharge the jury
on the illness of a juror; (3) the admission of evidence- that, before the
RECENT CASE NOTES
accident, plaintiff's car and another car were forced into a ditch by
defendant, and when defendant failed to pass he followed plaintiff's car
so closely thereafter that he could see little girls looking out of the back
window of plaintiff's car. Held: Judgment affirmed. Flamion v. Davis,
Appellate Court of Indiana, December 12, 1929, 169 N. E. 60.
1. Each paragraph was sufficient to apprise defendant of the charge
against him and to show that defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury, and the evidentiary facts which defendant sought
to have embraced in the complaint were unnecessary. The rule is that
only where the facts on which the conclusion in the pleading is based
do not sufficiently appear from the pleading is it error to overrule a
motion to make more specific; it was not reversible error therefore to
overrule both the demurrer and the motion to make more specific. Burns'
Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 360; Indiana Mfg. Co. v. CoughIin, 65 Ind. App. 268.
2. Generally it is not competent to prove that defendant is insured,
nor is it competent for counsel to comment on the fact to the jury. Van-
dalia Coal Co. v. Price, 178 Ind. 546; Inland Steel Co. v. Gillespie, 181 Ind.
633; Norris v. West, 78 Ind. App. 391. But where, as in the principal
case, defendant voluntarily testifies that he carried insurance, he can
not later complain when plaintiff comments thereon and where the verdict
is fully supported by the evidence. Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v.
Miller, 141 Ind. 533; In re Darrow, 92 N. E. 369.
3. The evidence offered was not too remote. It was competent, as
part of the res gestae, helping to explain the conduct and motives of the
parties at the time of the accident. Res gestae includes the surrounding
facts of a transaction as well to explain the act done as for showing a
motive for the transaction; circumstances which are contemporaneous with
the main fact under consideration or so nearly related to it as to illus-
trate its character and the state of mind, sentiments, or dispositions of
the actors are parts of the res gestae. Bolds v. Woods, 9 Ind. App. 657;
Daywitt v. Daywitt, 63 Ind. App. 454; O'Conner v. Gilloxy, 170 Ind. 428.
4. It was not error to continue the case for a week instead of dis-
charging the jury because of a juror's illness. While the illness of a
juror may be ground for discharge, if the illness is only temporary it is
proper to wait a reasonable time for his recovery. 17 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law (2nd Ed.) 1251.
The case is clearly sound on all the points involved.
R. C. H.
